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I.   INTRODUCTION
“Instead of trying to discourage private litigation, reforms should 
strive to make it work.”1
 For the past several decades, Congress has struggled to develop a 
system of private litigation that works for securities fraud claims. 
Most notably, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act (the Reform Act) of 1995 in response to complaints that 
plaintiffs were abusing the litigation process.2 Specifically, many in-
dividuals alleged that plaintiffs were excessively filing frivolous 
claims, or strike suits, hoping the corporations they sued would suc-
cumb to the pressures of litigation and settle.3 Accordingly, the Re-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
? J.D., Florida State University College of Law, 2011; B.S. Finance, Florida State 
University College of Business, 2008. The author wishes to thank Professor Manuel Utset 
for his helpful comments and guidance on earlier drafts. The author also wishes to thank 
her family for their constant support and guidance. 
 1. Shannon Rose Selden, (Self-)Policing the Market: Congress’s Flawed Approach to 
Securities Law Reform, 33 J. LEGIS. 57, 96 (2006). 
 2. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).  
 3. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683; see also
Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants 
and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAW. 1009 (1996). Strike suits are suits “based on no valid claim, 
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form Act established certain procedural barriers, including a height-
ened pleading standard and mandatory stay on discovery, aimed at 
preventing plaintiffs from bringing such claims.4 As a result, courts 
began to dismiss more securities fraud cases, finding they did not 
comply with the Reform Act’s new procedural requirements.5
However, the Reform Act has failed to truly “make it work.” While 
the Reform Act has successfully screened out more frivolous claims, 
the increased dismissal rate, in light of recent corporate fraud and 
accounting scandals, has exposed an adverse consequence of the leg-
islation. Namely, the strict procedural barriers allow some securities 
fraud to go undeterred and unpunished.6 In short, the Reform Act may 
preclude plaintiffs with legitimate claims from succeeding in litigation.7
This problem may be explained by the principal-agent relation-
ship that exists between investors and corporations. Specifically, pri-
vate securities litigation embodies what is known as the informed 
defendant model, a scenario wherein the corporation, but not the in-
vestor, knows whether it has violated federal securities law, creating 
an information asymmetry.8 The provisions of the Reform Act further 
skew this asymmetry in favor of the corporation, creating a defen-
dant-friendly securities litigation regime. Thus, Congress overlooked 
the need to reach a balance between procedural safeguards that pre-
vent frivolous litigation and devices that deter corporate wrongdo-
ing.9 Instead, the Reform Act focused on eliminating the previous 
hardships felt by corporations at the hands of aggressive plaintiffs. 
Accordingly, Congress needs to reexamine these competing objectives 
to provide a workable system where plaintiffs will be unsuccessful if 
they file frivolous claims and corporations will not only be deterred 
by the threat of litigation but also punished if they violate federal 
securities laws.      
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 679 (9th ed. 2004). 
 4. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1018. 
 5. Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 913, 969 (2003). 
 6. Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect 
of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ’33 and ’34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 
537, 564 (1998). 
 7. See id. at 538 (arguing “the Reform Act implements a standard that is outcome de-
terminative and, if strictly applied, virtually impossible to meet”).
 8.  See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 550 (1997).  
 9. These competing interests were discussed in the Second Circuit case In re Time 
Warner Securities Litigation. The court in that case noted regulation and litigation must 
balance the “interest in deterring fraud in the securities markets” with the “interest in 
deterring the use of the litigation process as a device for extracting undeserved settlements 
as the price of avoiding the extensive discovery costs that frequently ensue once a com-
plaint survives dismissal.” In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation, 9 F.3d 259, 263 (2d 
Cir. 1993). 
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While no standard could achieve the perfect balance, this Note at-
tempts to examine the steps necessary to reach a more auspicious 
equilibrium. First, Part II of this Note discusses the history and im-
portance of private securities litigation. Additionally, it details the 
abusive practices of plaintiffs’ attorneys that led Congress to seek 
reform. Part III then discusses Congress’s answer to the problem—
the Reform Act—and the consequences that followed. Part IV ex-
plains the failures of the Reform Act through common notions of 
game theory. Specifically, this Part frames private securities litiga-
tion as a sequential game between principal and agent entrenched 
with information asymmetries that are only amplified by the provi-
sions in the Reform Act. Most importantly, this Part recognizes that 
the Reform Act’s procedural barriers may be too high, preventing 
some plaintiffs with meritorious claims from succeeding and allowing 
securities fraud to remain unpunished. Lastly, Part V suggests certain 
modifications to the current regime to reduce these information 
asymmetries and create a more favorable system of private securities 
litigation. In particular, this Part suggests lowering the procedural 
barriers under the Reform Act by adopting a lower pleading standard, 
instituting a judicially managed discovery process, and implementing 
factors similar to those used by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) to evaluate a motion to dismiss. Additionally, this Part 
calls Congress to reevaluate the perceived harms of frivolous litiga-
tion and recognize its possibility to produce positive externalities. 
II.   A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION AND THE 
EXPLOSION OF ABUSIVE LITIGATION PRACTICES
A. Background of Federal Securities Law and Private Litigation 
Under the Fraud Provisions 
Following the events of the Great Depression, Congress sought to 
improve government intervention in the securities market10 with the 
passage of the Securities Act of 1933 (the ’33 Act)11 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the ’34 Act).12 With this legislation, Congress 
hoped to “increase investor confidence” in the marketplace.13 How-
ever, the mere presence of these regulations was not enough to pre-
vent another financial disaster. Thus, Congress provided for two 
separate methods of enforcing the Acts.14 First, the SEC was given 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 10. Evan Hill, The Rule 10b-5 Suit: Loss Causation Pleading Standards in Private Secu-
rities Fraud Claims After Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2659, 
2665 (2010). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 77a, et seq. (2006). 
 12. Id. § 78a, et seq.  
 13. Brandon C. Helms, The Supreme Court’s Dura Decision Unfortunately Secures a 
Brighter Future for 10b-5 Defendants, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 189, 189 (2006). 
 14. Id.
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primary authority to bring enforcement actions against violators.15
Yet, the SEC has limited resources and is unable to pursue every al-
leged violation of securities law.16 Therefore, private securities litiga-
tion has been deemed the “necessary supplement” to SEC enforce-
ment action and the second means of enforcing the Acts.17
Most private class actions are brought under the “catchall” fraud 
provisions18—section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5—
because of their broad scope.19 Section 10(b) prohibits the use of “ma-
nipulative or deceptive device[s]” in violation of any SEC Rule.20 This 
provision also permits the SEC to promulgate rules necessary for the 
enforcement of section 10(b),21 leading to the adoption of Rule 10b-5.22
Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any person to “employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud” or to make misleading statements or 
omit material facts that would mislead others in “connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.”23 Although these provisions do not 
explicitly provide investors with the right to sue, courts have consis-
tently implied private rights of action.24 The elements required to es-
tablish a securities fraud claim under these provisions include: “(1) a 
material misrepresentation (or omission) . . . (2) scienter, i.e., a 
wrongful state of mind . . . (3) a connection with the purchase or sale 
of a security . . . (4) reliance, often referred to in cases involving pub-
lic securities markets (fraud-on-the-market cases) as ‘transaction 
causation’ . . . (5) economic loss . . . and (6) ‘loss causation’ . . . . ”25
Private rights of action, specifically class actions, produce numer-
ous benefits. In particular, they provide an avenue for harmed inves-
tors to receive financial recovery.26 They also reduce the negative ex-
ternalities of securities fraud, such as decreased “investors’ confi-
dence in the economy,” “inaccurate pricing signals,” and “misalloca-
tion of capital.”27 Under class actions, individual shareholders who 
would normally find litigation inefficient and costly are able to com-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 15. Id.
 16. Brian S. Sommer, The PSLRA Decade of Decadence: Improving Balance in the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Arena with a Screening Panel Approach, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 413, 
419 (2005); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex 
Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 101 (2008) (arguing the SEC is faced with scarce re-
sources and agency capture). 
 17. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). 
 18. Hill, supra note 10, at 2662. 
 19. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1031; see also Hill, supra note 10, at 2662. 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 21. Id.
 22. Hill, supra note 10, at 2667. 
 23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 24. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975). 
 25. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005) (emphasis omitted). 
 26. Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1029. 
 27. Robert Allen, Securities Litigation as a Coordination Problem, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
475, 493 (2009). 
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bine their claims with other shareholders in a cost-effective manner.28
Additionally, class actions promote investor confidence in our mar-
kets by enforcing a system of disclosure. Punishing those who make 
false representations ensures most information disclosed to the pub-
lic is accurate.29 Moreover, private actions deter securities fraud vio-
lations30 by increasing the likelihood corporations will be sued for 
their wrongdoings.31
B.   The Explosion of Abusive Litigation Practices 
Beginning in the 1970s, private securities litigation “evolved from 
a ‘necessary supplement to [SEC] action’ to a state of ‘vexatiousness’ 
more prevalent and severe than other types of litigation.”32 Plaintiffs 
began to take advantage of the lax rules of federal procedure in order 
to pursue abusive tactics. While Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure only requires plaintiffs to plead a “short and plain state-
ment” of the claim,33 securities claims are subject to the specialized 
pleading standard of fraud found in Rule 9(b). Under Rule 9(b), a 
complaint must “state with particularity the circumstances constitut-
ing fraud or mistake”; yet, the complaint can assert generally 
“[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s 
mind.”34 However, courts rarely granted motions to dismiss for failing 
to sufficiently state a securities fraud claim under these standards.35
Courts maintained such motions would only be granted in limited 
instances where “ ‘it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him 
to relief.’ ”36
These lenient rules permitted plaintiffs to file often and file fast 
without regard to the merits of their claim. For example, class action 
plaintiffs would often file “stock drop” cases—a lawsuit spawned by 
an abrupt drop in a company’s stock price almost immediately after 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 28. Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON & ORG. 598, 590 (2007). 
 29. Ryan G. Miest, Note, Would the Real Scienter Please Stand Up: The Effect of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Pleading Securities Fraud, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 1103, 1104 (1998). 
 30. See Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the 
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10B-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1301, 1318 (2008). 
 31. Shaun Mulreed, Note, Private Securities Litigation Reform Failure: How Scienter 
has Prevented the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 From Achieving Its Goals,
42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 784 (2005). 
 32. Sommer, supra note 16, at 420 (alteration in original). 
 33. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 35. Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1034. 
 36. Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (citations omitted)). 
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bad news about the company was publicly announced.37 These claims 
were filed within days and sometimes even hours after the price 
dropped.38 Accordingly, plaintiffs’ attorneys engaged in “fishing expe-
dition[s],” attempting to find evidence supporting their claim after 
the complaint was filed.39 Such expeditions were possible under broad 
discovery provisions40 and infrequently imposed sanctions.41 Plain-
tiffs’ attorneys were also able to bring as many suits as possible 
through a diversification approach. Particularly, plaintiffs’ firms 
would “file many suits, with a minimum investment of resources in 
each suit, and to develop a stable income stream from their contingent 
fee arrangements.”42 Since only a few suits would prove unsuccessful, 
there was little “downside risk” to filing as many as possible.43          
Further, in securities fraud lawsuits, the plaintiff and defendant 
face asymmetric discovery burdens. While plaintiffs incur minimal 
costs,44 defendants are required to produce numerous records and de-
ponents, making the process extremely “expensive and time-
consuming.”45 These costs ultimately induce corporations to settle 
without regard to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.46 Aware of this, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys engaged in “legalized ‘extortion,’ ”47 filing merit-
less suits as “ ‘leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement’ ” 
from the corporations they sued.48
The fraud-on-the-market theory, upheld in Basic Inc. v. Levin-
son,49 further alleviated what little obstacles stood in the way of 
plaintiffs bringing frivolous claims. Among other things, a plaintiff 
must prove reliance on a material misstatement or omission to re-
cover under a section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 claim.50 However, the fraud-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 37. James C. Dugan, Securities Litigation and the Economic Crisis: Leading Lawyers on 
Understanding the Current Legal Environment, Developing Litigation Best Practices, and 
Helping Clients Respond to a Changing Marketplace, 2009 WL 1615203 (Aspatore), at *1 
(Apr. 2009). 
 38. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1011 (describing lawsuits that were filed less 
than five hours after Philip Morris announced a decrease in its earnings in 1993). 
 39. John F. Olson et al., Pleading Reform, Plaintiff Qualification and Discovery Stays 
Under the Reform Act, 51 BUS. LAW. 1101, 1112 (1996).  
 40. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
 41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 42. Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1036. 
 43. See id. at 1037. 
 44. Olson et al., supra note 39, at 1112. 
 45. Selden, supra note 1, at 75. 
 46. See Charles M. Yablon, Essay, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and Pri-
vate Securities Litigation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 585 (2000). 
 47. Richard H. Walker et al., The New Securities Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State 
Detours, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 641, 645 (1997). 
 48. Damian Moos, Note, Pleading Around the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: 
Reevaluating the Pleading Requirements for Market Manipulation Claims, 78 S. CAL. L. REV.
763, 763-64 (2005) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 679 (2d Pocket ed. 2001)). 
 49. 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988) (“It is not inappropriate to apply a presumption of reliance 
supported by the fraud-on-the-market theory.”). 
 50. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005). 
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on-the-market theory precludes the need to prove reliance on mis-
leading statements or disclosures.51 Instead, a plaintiff may claim the 
misstatements or omissions “caused her to pay a purchase price that 
is higher than it would have been but for the misstatement,”52 relying 
on the semi-strong presumption of market efficiency.53 Thus, as long 
as investors purchase the stock in an efficient market, misleading 
statements can defraud investors based on the effect it has on the 
stock price.54 While this theory has been subsequently limited by the 
Supreme Court,55 plaintiffs could nevertheless file suits based on 
misstatements or omissions without ever reading the company’s dis-
closure documents.56
These abusive practices not only harmed innocent corporations 
but also created negative implications market wide. First, abusive 
litigation undercuts the integrity of the judicial system.57 It also leads 
to poor public disclosure practices. With the constant possibility of 
strike suits, corporate managers are less inclined to make public 
statements for fear what they say could be subsequently used against 
them.58 Additionally, corporations incur costs defending meritless 
suits, which may be passed along to the shareholders.59 The Supreme 
Court recognized the problems of frivolous securities litigation in 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.60 Particularly, the Court 
noted two separate concerns: (1) the pendency of a meritless lawsuit 
“may frustrate or delay normal business activity of the defendant,” 
and (2) the “liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure” permit plaintiffs with “largely groundless claim[s] to sim-
ply take up the time of a number of other people . . . [imposing] a so-
cial cost rather than a benefit.”61 As then SEC Chairman Arthur 
Levitt noted, “the pendulum had swung too far toward plaintiffs, and 
it needed to be brought into better balance.”62
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 51. Rose, supra note 30, at 1311.  
 52. Merritt B. Fox, Understanding Dura, 60 BUS. LAW. 1547, 1548 (2005). 
 53. The semi-strong theory of market efficiency posits that stock prices represent all 
publicly available information, including material misstatements. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 246. 
 54. See id. at 247.  
 55. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 347-48. The Court in Dura held the fact a price was inflated 
by misstatements at the time of purchase is insufficient, standing alone, to establish the loss 
on the sale after the company disclosed the truth was caused by the misstatement. Id. In-
stead, the plaintiff must plead some additional information indicating a causal connection 
between misstatements and the loss. Id.
 56. Rose, supra note 30, at 1312. 
 57. Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1027. 
 58. Allen, supra note 27, at 502. 
 59. Id. at 481. 
 60. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
 61. Id. at 740, 741. 
 62. Arthur Levitt, “Final Thoughts on Litigation Reform”: Remarks by Chairman Arthur 
Levitt United States Securities and Exchange Commission 23rd Annual Securities Regulation 
Institute San Diego, California, January 24, 1996, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 835, 838 (1996). 
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III.   A CALL FOR REFORM: CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO CURB 
VEXATIOUS LITIGATION
A.   The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
To combat the problems of vexatious litigation, Congress passed 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act on December 22, 1995.63
The Reform Act was designed to promote voluntary disclosure by is-
suers, provide investors with primary authority over private litiga-
tion, and encourage plaintiffs to bring legitimate claims.64 Overall, 
the legislation sought to balance the interest of deterring securities 
fraud with the interest of deterring abusive litigation practices.65 Ac-
cordingly, Congress erected certain procedural hurdles to prevent 
plaintiffs from engaging in speculative litigation.66 These provisions, 
codified in section 21D of the ’34 Act, include: (1) a heightened plead-
ing requirement coupled with a stay on discovery if a motion to dis-
miss is filed;67 (2) the “most adequate plaintiff” rule—requiring courts 
to select an appropriate lead plaintiff in class action suits;68 and (3) 
mandatory Rule 11 sanctions imposed against attorneys for filing 
meritless claims.69
The heightened pleading standard is considered the most contro-
versial provision of the Reform Act. It requires a complaint alleging a 
misstatement or omission of material fact to “specify each statement 
alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the 
statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the state-
ment or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint 
shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is 
formed.”70 While this section does not significantly differ from the 
pre-Reform Act standard utilized by most courts, the following sec-
tion establishing the pleading requirements for scienter is considered 
more of a “wild card.”71 Specifically, it requires that a “complaint 
shall . . . state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong infer-
ence that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”72
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 63. Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737; see also Mulreed, supra note 31, at 780. 
 64. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683. 
 65. Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1009.   
 66. Id. at 1018. 
 67. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3) (2006). 
 68. Id. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(i). A detailed discussion of this particular provision is outside the 
scope of this Note. 
 69. Id. § 77z-1(c). 
 70. Id. § 78u-4(b)(1). 
 71. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, 
Why the Fat Lady has not Yet Sung, 51 BUS. LAW. 975, 978 (1996). 
 72. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). Following the passage of the Reform Act, courts were 
imposing various interpretations of the “strong inference” requirement. One author recog-
nized three different lines of cases that developed. Patricia J. Meyer, What Congress Said 
About the Heightened Pleading Standard: A Proposed Solution to the Securities Fraud Plead-
ing Confusion, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2517, 2535 (1998). However, the Supreme Court resolved 
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While Congress was drafting the legislation, there was much de-
bate surrounding these heightened pleading provisions. The most 
notable opposition came from President Clinton, who vetoed the Re-
form Act, arguing the legislation would have the damaging effect of 
“closing the courthouse door on investors who have legitimate 
claims.”73 President Clinton was concerned the requirements to plead 
scienter “impose[d] an unacceptable procedural hurdle to meritorious 
claims being heard in Federal courts.”74 Nevertheless, Congress over-
rode the veto and passed the legislation. 
The Reform Act also includes a provision that imposes a stay on 
discovery when a motion to dismiss is filed.75 This provision sought to 
eliminate abusive fishing expeditions76 and to reduce the high costs of 
discovery that often compel innocent corporations to settle meritless 
lawsuits.77 The stay will only be excused if discovery is “necessary to 
preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice.”78 This provision, 
when enforced with the heightened pleading standard, ensures only 
the strongest complaints survive a motion to dismiss. 
Further, Congress sought to “give[] teeth” to these provisions by 
enhancing the sanctions for violations of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.79 Under Rule 11, claims must be supported by ex-
isting law while factual contentions must be supported by evidence.80
Section 21D(c) of the Exchange Act requires the court, upon comple-
tion of the case, to determine compliance with Rule 11.81 If a violation 
is discovered, the court shall impose sanctions on the violating party, 
consisting of reasonable attorney’s fees and other costs to be paid to 
the opposing party.82 Ultimately, this provision requires courts to me-
ticulously scrutinize the complaints filed before them and punish 
those who file meritless claims.  
B.   The Consequences of the Reform Act 
The Reform Act failed to achieve its primary goal—preventing 
plaintiffs from filing frivolous lawsuits. Although the number of com-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
this discrepancy in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). The 
Court in Tellabs required the inference of scienter to be “cogent and at least as compelling as 
any plausible opposing inference.” Id. at 310.    
 73. William J. Clinton, Veto Message on the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 
H.R. Doc. 140-150, 141 CONG. REC. 37797 (Dec. 19, 1995). 
74. Id. at 37798. 
 75. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006). 
 76. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, 1044.  
 77. Walker et al., supra note 47, at 648. 
 78. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006). 
 79. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 39 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 738. 
 80. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 81. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1) (2006). 
 82. Id. § 78u-4(c)(2)–(3)(A). Sanctions may be waived only if awarding attorney’s fees 
will inflict an unreasonable and unjust burden on the violating party. Id. § 78u-4(c)(3)(B)(i). 
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plaints filed initially decreased in 1996, this was mainly because 
plaintiffs were taking their claims to state court where stricter stan-
dards had not been implemented.83 However, the Securities Litiga-
tion Uniform Standards Act of 1998 preempted state law causes of 
action for securities fraud and placed the claims back in federal 
courts.84 Overall, the number of private actions filed increased after 
the passage of the Reform Act.85 One study indicated that the average 
number of securities issuers sued each year increased by 32% for six 
years following the Reform Act’s enactment.86
The Reform Act’s inability to curtail frivolous litigation is attrib-
utable to the lack of downside risk plaintiffs currently face. Even af-
ter the passage of the Reform Act, plaintiffs find it cost-effective to 
file as many strike suits as possible. Specifically, courts are still re-
luctant to impose sanctions for Rule 11 violations,87 allowing plain-
tiffs’ attorneys to freely carry on with their diversification strate-
gies.88 And because the Reform Act has made it more difficult to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs’ attorneys have even more incen-
tive to not only bring as many suits as possible but also “throw every 
available bit of favorable information into the complaint in hopes 
that the judge will be induced by the sheer number of paragraphs to 
conclude that the complaint has alleged fraud with specificity.”89
Yet, the Reform Act was not a complete failure. Specifically, the 
Act successfully reduced the overall costs associated with frivolous 
litigation in several ways.90 First, federal courts have dismissed more 
complaints for failing to meet the Reform Act’s heightened pleading 
standard.91 Following the passage of the Reform Act, the dismissal 
rate more than doubled.92 In addition, the Reform Act has success-
fully slowed the “race to the courthouse.” Plaintiffs’ attorneys are 
now taking more time to investigate actions before they file,93 evi-
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denced by an increase in the time between a drop in the price of a 
stock and the filing of a related lawsuit.94 Now, additional prepara-
tion is necessary to sufficiently state with particularity those facts 
giving rise to a “strong inference” of fraudulent intent. Attorneys 
have also modified the types of complaints filed since the passage of 
the Reform Act. Instead of traditional stock drop cases, plaintiffs now 
focus on accounting irregularities and insider trading,95 rendering the 
complaints longer and more complicated as they discuss the me-
chanical nuances of accounting rules.96 Thus, the Reform Act imposed 
obstacles that successfully prevent plaintiffs with frivolous claims 
from surviving a motion to dismiss.   
IV.   THE REFORM ACT’S INFLUENCE ON FRAUDULENT ACTIVITY FROM 
A GAME THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE
A.   A Balancing of Errors 
While it is likely that more frivolous claims are being dismissed, 
the Reform Act has created consequences insufficiently considered by 
the enacting Congress—consequences that may have potentially neg-
ative implications on the securities market. In particular, by estab-
lishing stricter procedural standards, courts are not only screening 
out frivolous cases but also screening out cases with merit, creating a 
“climate in which frauds are more likely to occur.”97 Thus, it appears 
Congress preferred some meritorious claims to go unprosecuted ra-
ther than allow frivolous lawsuits that may harm corporations.98 But 
given the recent wave of corporate fraud, including the events of En-
ron and WorldCom, was the trade-off really worth it? 
One author has characterized this problem as an imbalance be-
tween Type I and Type II errors.99 A Type I error, also known as a 
false positive, results when a defendant is found to have committed 
securities fraud, when in reality no fraud transpired.100 This usually 
occurs when a court allows frivolous claims to proceed to litigation.101
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On the other hand, a Type II error, or a false negative, takes place 
when a court dismisses a meritorious claim or mistakenly determines 
no fraud has occurred.102 Congress has overlooked the importance of 
balancing Type I and Type II errors to reach a viable equilibrium 
that will both deter corporations from making fraudulent statements 
while simultaneously deterring plaintiffs from filing frivolous claims. 
Yet, achieving such a balance is easier said than done. Complications 
arise from the inherent principle-agent relationship that exists be-
tween shareholders and corporate managers. 
B.   Modeling Private Securities Litigation as a Sequential Game  
Between Agent and Principle 
An agency relationship results when an investor (principle) gives 
her money to a corporation (agent) to manage.103 In this type of agen-
cy relationship, the agent possesses information about the corpora-
tion the investor does not have.104 Thus, investors need to protect 
themselves should the corporation abuse this information asymmetry 
by making material misstatements or omissions.105 However, it is 
costly for a principle to monitor the agent’s actions.106
Threat of litigation is one way to avoid monitoring costs, but a 
plaintiff must first decide whether to bring suit. This decision can be 
framed as a multi-player, sequential game between the investor and 
the corporation. Under the norms of game theory, a sequential game 
involves a situation where the players make alternating moves.107
One player’s move will depend upon the previous and possible future 
actions of the other player.108 Additionally, each player must “antici-
pate the future decisions” and reason backwards to make the correct 
choice at earlier points in the game.109 At the outset, it is important to 
note corporations in this sequential game are repeat players. They 
will continue to issue securities and thus will continue to be sued by 
investors who believe they were injured. Therefore, the corporation’s 
actions should send credible signals to both investors in the current 
game and the entire market for possible future games.   
The decision to bring suit for a section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 viola-
tion begins after the plaintiff believes a manager or executive of a 
company in which she holds stock has made a misstatement or omis-
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sion of material fact. The plaintiff must then decide whether or not to 
file suit. A plaintiff will sue if she knows her suit has merit or if she 
is unsure of the merits because no preliminary investigation has been 
performed.110 Additionally, when deciding whether to sue, a rational 
plaintiff will consider the costs involved. Plaintiffs incur nominal 
costs when filing a securities fraud claim,111 particularly if they ag-
gregate their claim with other plaintiffs in the form of a class ac-
tion.112 However, the Reform Act requires plaintiffs to engage in 
backward reasoning when making this initial decision. Specifically, if 
a plaintiff determines her complaint would not survive a motion to 
dismiss if one was filed, or if she believes she may be subject to the 
Reform Act’s stricter Rule 11 sanctions, it is likely the plaintiff will 
decide to not bring suit.  
If a plaintiff does file a lawsuit, the corporation must then decide 
whether to make a settlement offer or litigate the claim.113 At this 
point in the sequential game, the corporation may use the informa-
tion asymmetry between the principle and agent to its advantage. 
The corporation knows whether it committed securities fraud and, if 
fraud has occurred, a corporation would prefer to settle instead of 
proceed to litigation. Litigation is costly and class actions force corpo-
rations to redirect their resources from their “best use” to defending 
allegations of securities fraud.114 Moreover, an adverse judgment 
against the corporation could damage its reputation and profitability.115
If a corporation offers to settle, the plaintiff must decide whether 
to accept or reject the offer.116 In most instances, a plaintiff faced with 
this kind of information inequity would likely accept the settlement 
offer. For example, assume the plaintiff files suit but has not per-
formed an investigation to determine the merits of her claim. Further 
assume, as is true in most securities fraud cases, the corporation is 
unaware whether the plaintiff knows if her claim is meritorious or 
frivolous.117 A corporation’s offer to settle signals to the plaintiff her 
case may have merit and allows her to free ride off the corporation’s 
actions without undergoing the costs of investigation.118 If the plain-
tiff rejects the corporation’s settlement offer or the corporation re-
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fuses to settle, the plaintiff must then decide whether to litigate or 
drop the case.119
C.   The Informed Defendant Model: Increasing the Information Gap 
Between Plaintiff and Defendant 
The sequential game discussed in the previous section is known 
as the informed defendant model. It represents a scenario where the 
defendant, but not the plaintiff, knows if a suit is meritless,120 creat-
ing information asymmetries the defendant may use to its advantage. 
While the informed defendant model contemplates a corporation 
faced with a lawsuit will either settle or not, it fails to consider a 
third option made more viable under the Reform Act. Specifically, 
corporations may also respond by filing a motion to dismiss. As evi-
denced by the increased dismissal rates in the post-Reform Act era, 
this seems to be a popular option.121 Therefore, plaintiffs, as players 
in this sequential game, must recognize defendants may file a motion to 
dismiss when they make the initial decision of whether to bring suit.   
The defendant-friendly regime created by the Reform Act coupled 
with the nature of the informed defendant model makes filing a mo-
tion to dismiss an advantageous choice for corporations. Doing so 
prevents plaintiffs from leveling the informational playing field. Par-
ticularly, once a motion to dismiss is filed, the Reform Act mandates 
a stay on discovery,122 preventing plaintiffs from gathering any in-
formation on their claim that is not publicly available. The height-
ened pleading standard, therefore, incorrectly “assumes that in meri-
torious fraud cases, public information will provide sufficient evi-
dence of intent to enable plaintiffs to meet this high threshold.”123 In 
actuality, the heightened pleading standard places plaintiffs in a 
“procedural catch 22.”124 Assuming most corporations do not disclose 
their fraudulent intentions publicly, plaintiffs are unable to uncover 
sufficient information that meets the Reform Act’s strict standards to 
survive a motion to dismiss, potentially screening out meritorious 
claims. These “excessive restrictions to pursuing securities fraud 
claims . . . insulate fraudfeasors from suit and filter meritorious law-
suits.”125 Therefore, the Reform Act allows some violations of federal 
securities law to remain unpunished. 
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Moreover, the information asymmetries under the informed de-
fendant model make a motion to dismiss a more attractive option 
than settlement or litigation. Filing a motion to dismiss sends a sig-
nal, although perhaps an inaccurate one, to uninformed plaintiffs 
that their complaint is frivolous. Plaintiffs normally rely on these 
signals since they rarely perform initial investigations.126 Thus, a 
plaintiff faced with such motion may drop the case. Additionally, cor-
porations may file a motion to dismiss to prevent plaintiffs from un-
covering information that reveals other misdeeds of the corporation. 
Additionally, cases decided by the Supreme Court following the 
passage of the Reform Act only made it more difficult for plaintiffs 
with legitimate claims to succeed. For example, in 2005, the Supreme 
Court decided Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo.127 The plaintiffs 
in Dura brought a securities fraud action against managers and di-
rectors of the company, claiming the company’s false statements 
about the expected approval of a new device by the Food and Drug 
Administration inflated the price of the stock.128 The Court, however, 
determined the complaint was “legally insufficient,” reasoning the 
inflated purchase price, by itself, did not prove loss causation.129 In-
stead, a plaintiff must be able to provide “some indication of the loss 
and the causal connection.”130 Consequently, Dura made it more diffi-
cult for plaintiffs to meet the loss causation element for a section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim. 
Two years later, the Supreme Court decided a case that would 
raise the bar for plaintiffs even higher. In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Is-
sues & Rights, Ltd., the Court attempted to establish a uniform in-
terpretation of the Reform Act’s pleading requirement for fraudulent 
intent.131 While the Court recognized the need to balance the “twin 
goals” of private securities litigation—preventing frivolous filings 
while protecting defrauded investors132—it seems the Court ulti-
mately sided with the corporations. Specifically, the Court held an 
“inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reason-
able—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing 
inference of nonfraudulent intent.”133 Together, these cases have di-
minished the probability plaintiffs with valid claims may “success-
fully . . . litigate a securities fraud claim.”134
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Accordingly, some have speculated that the Reform Act’s effect of 
screening out meritorious suits is linked to the surge of corporate 
fraud in the early 2000s, including the Enron and WorldCom scan-
dals.135 Although it is unlikely that the Reform Act’s severe provisions 
were the leading cause of this rise in crime,136 they may have been a 
contributing factor. The ease with which meritorious claims may be 
dismissed has lessened private litigation’s deterrence effect on secu-
rities fraud. Specifically, the Reform Act has “encouraged aggressive 
marketplace behavior.”137 While unconstrained aggressiveness may 
be beneficial for a corporation’s bottom line, it is detrimental to the 
market as a whole. For example, recent incidents of corporate fraud 
“have led many ordinary Americans to conclude that our securities 
fraud deterrence regime is broken.”138 Ultimately, the Reform Act 
overcorrected the perceived abuses of frivolous litigation and shifted the 
pendulum away from plaintiffs and too far in favor of corporations. 
V.   RESTORING BALANCE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT
While some argue the Reform Act strikes an appropriate balance 
between Type I and Type II errors,139 the above discussion illustrates 
otherwise. The Reform Act’s procedural barriers reduced the occur-
rence of Type I errors by screening out frivolous litigation. However, 
the Reform Act has overcorrected by allowing more Type II errors, 
effectively precluding meritorious claims from reaching settlement or 
litigation. Therefore, Congress must take curative measures to attain 
a better balance between these competing errors. Specifically, re-
forms should work to reduce the procedural obstacles plaintiffs face 
by requiring a lesser pleading standard and instituting a judicially 
managed discovery process. Additionally, Congress should require 
the SEC to promulgate standards that courts may use when ruling 
on motions to dismiss in private securities fraud cases.   
These modifications find some support in the theory that frivo-
lous litigation may actually generate positive externalities that help 
combat securities fraud. While much literature discusses the down-
falls of frivolous litigation,140 Congress should reevaluate these per-
ceived harms and recognize the possible benefits. Society is con-
cerned Americans are “too litigious” and that “frivolous litigation is 
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out of control”;141 however, there is no clear base line of what com-
prises frivolity.142 It is arguable frivolous litigation may generate 
benefits similar to legitimate class actions, such as deterrence, trans-
parency, and accountability.143 For example, a plaintiff who brings a 
meritless section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 claim may uncover other viola-
tions of the corporation. Thus, preventing plaintiffs with even frivo-
lous claims from partaking in discovery could allow other securities 
fraud violations to remain unexposed and unpunished. 
A.   Lowering the Pleading Standard 
Prior to the Reform Act, circuit courts were split over how sci-
enter under a section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 claim should be pled.144 The 
most noted division existed between the Second and Ninth Circuits. 
Taking the stricter approach, the Second Circuit required that facts 
set forth in the complaint “give[] rise to a strong inference of fraudu-
lent intent.”145 Conversely, the more lenient Ninth Circuit held sci-
enter may be averred generally, “simply by saying that scienter ex-
isted.”146 However, it appears the Reform Act adopted the Second Cir-
cuit’s test, as it requires a complaint to “state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the 
required state of mind.”147   
Utilizing the Second Circuit’s “strong inference” test, the Reform 
Act attempted to increase the litigation risks faced by plaintiffs,148
placing more weight on their initial decision of whether to bring suit. 
Yet, as previously mentioned, the heightened pleading standard was 
unsuccessful in this regard. Instead, the “strong inference” test is 
overinclusive in its impact and, “if strictly applied and interpreted, 
will eliminate most private securities-fraud lawsuits.”149 Fraudulent 
intent is difficult to demonstrate,150 particularly if plaintiffs are fore-
closed from discovery, as corporations would be unwise to reveal their 
fraudulent intentions publicly. Thus, requiring facts demonstrating a 
“strong inference” before the opportunity for discovery imposes an 
excessive burden on plaintiffs.151
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Accordingly, Congress should lower the pleading requirements 
and allow existing law to serve as the initial screening device.152 Rule 
9(b) already requires complaints to “state with particularity the cir-
cumstances constituting fraud.”153 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Tellabs requires these circumstances be convincing and as 
“compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”154
Expanding upon these requirements in the Reform Act is merely 
“duplicative and unduly burdensome.”155 If the complaint is truly fri-
volous, the corporation will know that fact and can fight to defend the 
allegations by either filing a motion to dismiss or litigating the claim. 
Litigating not only allows a corporation to defend against existing 
frivolous claims but also allows the corporation, as a repeat player in 
this sequential game, to send signals to future plaintiffs indicating 
the corporation will not submit to the pressures of frivolous litigation 
and settle. Furthermore, concerns of abusive litigation can be ad-
dressed further down the line with judicially managed discovery and 
higher thresholds for motions to dismiss that do not focus exactingly 
on the face of the complaint. 
B.   Judicially Managed Discovery 
The Reform Act’s mandated stay on discovery amplifies the in-
formation asymmetry between investor and corporation. Preventing 
investors from obtaining information in support of their securities 
fraud claims places plaintiffs at a significant disadvantage. Addition-
ally, the stay on discovery allows corporations to exploit the informa-
tion gap created by the Reform Act by sending plaintiffs false signals 
about the merits of their claim through filing a motion to dismiss. 
Plaintiffs are unable to determine the validity of such signals unless 
verification is available through public information. Therefore, to re-
duce the information disparity between corporations and investors 
and to enhance corporate transparency, Congress should eliminate 
the Reform Act’s stay on discovery provision and implement a modi-
fied discovery process. 
Instead of prohibiting discovery, courts should partake in the 
“[j]udicial management” of private securities fraud cases.156 Under 
this modified process, a motion to dismiss would trigger judicially 
managed discovery. The court could then set a time limit for the 
plaintiff, establishing a certain number of days for permissible dis-
covery. During this time, the court may frame the discovery process 
as it sees fit—limiting the amount of depositions or document re-
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quests produced by either party. When the allotted time expires, the 
plaintiff would be allowed to resubmit a complaint pleading any addi-
tional factors uncovered during discovery in support of her claim. At 
this point, the court would analyze the plaintiff’s complaint under 
Rule 9(b) and the Tellabs standard, in addition to suggested factors 
borrowed from the SEC (discussed in the next section), to determine 
if the motion to dismiss should be granted or denied.   
Judicial management can reduce the costs normally imposed on 
corporate defendants and allows courts to “establish the scope and 
pace of permissible discovery.”157 Furthermore, eliminating the stay 
on discovery encourages plaintiffs to perform their own investigation 
to determine the merits of their case, instead of free riding on the 
corporation’s actions in the sequential game. Then, if a plaintiff real-
izes after investigation that her claim is meritless, she is free to drop 
the case. Furthermore, imposing a modified discovery process would 
permit more shareholders with valid claims to bring successful suits, 
combating the negative externalities created by securities fraud. Al-
lowing plaintiffs to uncover facts under the discretion of the judge 
will lead to more complaints that plead the requisite strong inference 
of scienter. This, in turn, will increase the successful prosecution of 
securities fraud. It will also “increase corporate transparency” by ex-
posing the “targeted information about the corporate practices” un-
covered in the discovery process.158
Judicial management of discovery, however, is not without its 
problems. Plaintiffs may still be enticed to file frivolous claims first 
and engage in abusive fishing expeditions later to leverage a settle-
ment from the corporation. However, judicial scrutiny over the dis-
covery process should work to reduce this problem. Nevertheless, 
modified discovery is only one factor necessary to create an appropri-
ate balance between Type I and Type II errors. Assistance from the 
SEC will also help limit abusive practices.  
C.   Integration of Securities and Exchange Commission Standards 
into the Private Realm 
Some scholars argue the best approach to balancing Type I and 
Type II errors is to eliminate private enforcement altogether, provid-
ing the SEC with exclusive authority over securities fraud enforce-
ment.159 While the SEC has specialized knowledge and experience in 
securities fraud, this approach ignores the reality that the SEC faces 
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many limitations.160 Instead, private litigation should borrow from 
some of the SEC’s expertise and practices.  
The SEC considers certain factors when deciding whether to im-
pose penalties on a corporation for securities fraud.161 These factors 
include: “[t]he need to deter the particular type of offense,” “[t]he ex-
tent of the injury . . . [suffered by] the innocent part[y],” “[t]he level of 
intent on the part of the perpetrator[],” how difficult it is to detect 
that type of violation, and the “[p]resence or lack of remedial steps” 
on behalf of the corporation.162 Congress should require the SEC to 
create similar factors to be used by courts when presented with a mo-
tion to dismiss. These factors would be considered in addition to 
whether the complaint satisfies Rule 9(b) and the Tellabs standard, 
thereby establishing a higher threshold to survive a motion to dis-
miss while effectively transforming the pleading standard into an-
other factor the court would consider. 
Whether a complaint meets the strong inference standard under 
Tellabs is important as an initial screening device; however, that 
standard should not be dispositive in a court’s decision to dismiss a 
complaint. Allowing courts to consider other important factors in-
creases the likelihood meritorious cases will succeed. SEC involve-
ment in this fashion provides an additional, but more lenient, level of 
screening out frivolous filings, while assisting plaintiffs disadvan-
taged by the information asymmetries under the informed defendant 
model. Moreover, as plaintiffs would have had the opportunity to un-
cover facts in judicially managed discovery, it is more likely those 
with frivolous complaints would decide to drop their cases, while le-
gitimate claims would survive a motion to dismiss if one were filed.   
Nevertheless, some may argue such factors will cause uncertainty 
in private securities litigation and remove some judicial decisionmak-
ing authority from the court. In particular, it is possible courts will 
not apply these factors uniformly. Yet, courts are frequently tasked 
with the responsibility of applying similar factor tests. To assist in 
this responsibility, courts could receive more assistance from the 
SEC. Particularly, courts could analyze the proffered factors with re-
gards to a specific case and submit, in writing, its analysis to the 
SEC for review. Regardless, instituting such factors balances the po-
tentially adverse effects of lowering the pleading standard. 
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D.   Why Stricter Rule 11 Sanctions Will Not Work 
Many have suggested stricter Rule 11 sanctions will reduce abu-
sive litigation practices, particularly if a lower pleading standard has 
been recommended.163 One author has even suggested applying dif-
ferent levels of sanctions based on assorted types of Rule 11 viola-
tions.164 This approach would require Congress to classify different 
violations and create a corresponding sanctions rubric.165 Courts 
would institute a sliding scale approach, imposing lower sanctions for 
less serious violations that incrementally increase with the severity 
of the violation.166 However, while sanctions may deter frivolous liti-
gation in other areas of law, they may not be as effective in private 
securities litigation. 
In an area of law where the underlying crime involves disclosure 
of information, stricter sanctions may not be an appropriate measure 
of deterrence. Corporations have incentives to hide adverse informa-
tion from the public. Particularly, corporations may lie because of 
“greed, fear, pressure, [and] opportunity.”167 Moreover, corporations 
will work to keep the truth hidden from the public. To effectively de-
ter frivolous litigation, sanctions must be high enough that plaintiffs 
will “internalize the net social costs of the contemplated misbehav-
ior,”168 yet not so high that it would lead to overdeterrence.169 Plain-
tiffs would have to consider the additional factor of Rule 11 sanctions 
when making the initial decision of whether to bring suit. As a result, 
strict sanctions imposed on plaintiffs for failure to uncover hidden 
information would significantly increase their downside risk and po-
tentially dissuade both meritless and meritorious claims from being 
filed. Thus, Rule 11 sanctions should be left to the discretion of the 
court so as to not deter investors from bringing legitimate claims. 
VI.   CONCLUSION
It is clear the Reform Act overcorrected the perceived abuses of 
private securities litigation. The increased dismissal rates in the 
post-Reform Act era indicate that while courts were successfully 
screening out frivolous litigation, they were also preventing meritori-
ous claims from proceeding to trial. Further, the Reform Act has cre-
ated an even wider information gap between investors and corpora-
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 163. See, e.g., Pandey-Jorrin, supra note 124, at 19. 
 164. Id.
 165. Id.
 166. Id. (“Thus, the more significant the court determines a Rule 11 violation to be, the 
more recovery that would be available to the defendant at the plaintiff’s expense.”). 
 167. Burch, supra note 16, at 93. 
 168. Rose, supra note 30, at 1322. 
 169. See Allen, supra note 27, at 498. 
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tions than previously existed under their principle-agent relation-
ship. Corporations may exploit this information asymmetry through 
the procedural barriers of the Reform Act, allowing some corporate 
fraud to slip through the cracks that private litigation was originally 
designed to fill. 
Private securities litigation needs to reclaim its responsibility as 
the necessary supplement to the SEC by effectively deterring and 
punishing securities fraud. Although finding an appropriate solution 
is not easy, Congress can take certain steps to “make it work.”170 By 
lowering the procedural bar established by the Reform Act, plaintiffs 
with meritorious claims are more likely to survive a motion to dismiss, 
particularly if judicially managed discovery is permitted. Additionally, 
even plaintiffs who may have initially filed frivolous claims should be 
allowed to perform discovery in the instance they might uncover oth-
er violations committed by the corporation. This, in turn, improves 
corporate transparency and accountability. Further, reducing the ini-
tial screening requirements for a section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim 
allows courts to institute stricter standards after discovery has taken 
place, applying standards similar to those currently utilized by the 
SEC. While this method is not guaranteed to achieve the perfect bal-
ance, “society must bear the risk that some suits will be brought 
when fraud has not occurred” if “actual fraud is to be combatted.”171
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 170. Selden, supra note 1, at 96 (emphasis omitted). 
 171. D. Brian Hufford, Deterring Fraud v. Avoiding the “Strike Suit”: Reaching an Ap-
propriate Balance, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 593, 628 (1995). 
